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U.S. SUPREME COURT MAKES IN OFFICIAL- THUMBS 
UP ON MANDA TORY ARBITRA TIONITHUMBS DOWN 
ON CLASS ARBITRATION (AT&T MOBILE, LLC v. 
CONCEPCION) 
by 
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, J.D., LL.M. * 
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) 1 in order to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration 
proceedings. Today the U.S. Supreme Court no longer bears 
animosity to this particular form of alternative dispute 
resolution. On the contrary, the majority of the current Court 
"rigorously enforces" mandatory arbitration agreements 
whether they have been negotiated at arms length between 
merchants or have been presented to employees and consumers 
in standard form contracts. In t}le recent case of AT&T 
Mobile, LLC v. Concepcion (AT&T Mobile), 2 the Court once 
again upheld a mandatory arbitration clause--but a mandatory 
arbitration that also contained an anti-class action provision--
on the grounds that the savings clause of the FAA preempts the 
application of a state law regarding unconscionable contracts. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In February 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion did what 
many people do everyday- they entered into a wireless service 
agreement. The provider of services in their case was Cingular 
Wireless (which was subsequently acquired by AT&T in 2005 
and renamed AT&T Mobility LCC in 2007). The agreement, 
*Professor of Legal Studies in Business, fona College, New 
Rochelle, NY 
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which was executed at the provider's retail store in Carlsbad, 
California, was a common "bundled" transaction in which each 
of the Concepcions received a "free" cell phone in exchange 
for agreeing to a two year service contract. The provider 
subsequently charged the Concepcions $30.22- for sales tax 
based on the full retail value of the "free" phones. 3 
The original agreement between the Concepcions and 
Cingular was a standard form contract that included a single 
page statement of "Terms and Conditions." Among the terms 
was a mandatory arbitration clause that also prohibited class 
actions. The arbitration clause was located near the bottom of 
the page in a paragraph that also stated the provider's limited 
liability under the plan. The word "ARBITRATION," which 
was capitalized and in bold, was followed by a sentence 
instructing the consumer to "read this paragraph carefully."4 
The paragraph went on to state that the parties would 
"negotiate in good faith to settle any dispute or claim arising 
from or relating to this Agreement" ... and if the parties "do 
not reach an agreement within 30 days, instead of suing in 
court," the parties "agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and 
claims arising out of this Agreement. " 5 A subsequent 
provision stated that the parties "agree that no Arbitrator has 
the authority to (1) award relief in excess of what this 
agreement provides; (2) award punitive damages or any other 
damages not measured by the prevailing party's actual 
damages; or (3) order consolidation or class arbitration."6 The 
only exception to the mandatory arbitration rule was if either 
party elected to file a complaint in small claims court. 7 
The Concepcions renewed their wireless agreements with 
Cingular (and its successor, AT&T) on a number of occasions. 
With each of the subsequent contracts, the Concepcions were 
given a current statement of the "Terms of Service." All of 
those statements included a "change-in-terms" clause that 
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allowed the provider to unilaterally amend the terms and 
conditions of the agreement at any time so long as the provider 
notified the customers of the changes either in their monthly 
bills or separately. 8 In December 2006, two months after the 
Concepcions had renewed their wireless contract, AT&T 
notified its customers that it had exercised its right under the 
"change-in-terms" clause to revise the agreement's arbitration 
policy. The amended arbitration provisions were much more 
explicit and, AT&T would subsequently argue, much more 
favorable to the consumer. 
The revised agreement still required disputes to be resolved 
in either small claims court or through individual (but not 
class-wide) arbitration hearings. In addition it introduced six 
significant changes. The first was the establishment of a new 
premium payment term requiring the provider to pay the 
customer $7,500 in the event that the arbitrator's actual award 
was less than $7,500 but greater than the provider's last written 
settlement offer prior to selection of the arbitrator. 9 The 
second was AT &T's promise to pay double the amount of 
customer's attorney fees and reimburse any of the attorney' s 
reasonable expenses accrued while investigating, preparing, 
and pursuing the client's claim in arbitration- but only if the 
arbitrator awarded the customer more that the provider's last 
written settlement offer. 10 The third prohibited the provider 
from seeking attorneys' fees and expenses--even if it prevailed 
in arbitration and even if it had the right to do so under the 
law. 11 The fourth allowed punitive damages to be awarded to 
the extent allowed in court. 12 The fifth provided that the 
customer had the exclusive option of deciding whether the 
arbitration would be conducted in person, by telephone, or 
based solely on submission of documents--so long as the claim 
was for $10,000 or less. 13 Finally, it specified that arbitration 
would take place in the county of the customer's billing 
address. 14 
... 
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II. PREVIOUS LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA 
The Concepcions were not the only dissatisfied California 
consumers to have entered into similar wireless service 
agreements with their cell phone providers. In late 2004 and 
early 2005, Elizabeth Voorhies accepted a bundled transaction 
with Cingular (through its agent Go Wireless) and Jennifer 
Laster accepted one with T-Mobile. Each was given a "free 
phone" and then charged for the sales tax on its full retail 
value. In May 2005, Voorhies, Laster, and an additional 
plaintiff, Andrew Thompson, filed complaints against their 
providers in the California Superior Court. 15 While 
Thompson's case was dismissed without prej udice, the other 
two where removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California under the Federal Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 (CAF A). 16 In August 2005, Voorhies and Laster 
filed an amended complaint on behalf of themselves and all 
other consumers who had entered into similar bundled 
transactions, received free phones, and been charged for the 
sales tax. 17 The complaint alleged that the providers had 
engaged in violations of California's False Advertising Law 
(FAL), 18 the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), 19 and the 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). 20 The providers 
responded by filing motions to compel arbitration and to 
dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to § 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court denied the motion 
to compel arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration 
agreements were both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable under California contract law. The motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint was granted without prejudice 
since the plaintiffs, in their UCL and F AL claims, had failed to 
allege reliance on the providers' misrepresentations when 
making their decisions to accept the cell phones. The CLRA 
claim, on the other hand, was dismissed with prejudice for 
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failure to comply with statutory notice requirements set forth in 
California Code§ 1782.21 
In December 2005, AT&T and T-Mobile (who were later 
joined by the other defendants) appealed the Court's denial of 
their motion to compel arbitration and moved to stay the 
proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. The plaintiffs 
then filed a second amended complaint- to which the 
defendants responded by filing an instant motion to dismiss. 
The Court denied the defendants' motions to compel arbitration 
and to dismiss the second complaint but their motion to 
stay the proceedings pending the appeal. 2 
The Concepcions filed their own lawsuit against AT&T in 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California in 
March 2006. Their complaint alleged that AT &T's practice of 
charging sales taxes for phones that were advertised as "free" 
constituted fraud. The following September, the U.S. District 
Court consolidated the Concepcions' case with the Laster 
putative class action lawsuit. 23 
In August 2007, before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit had ruled on the lower court's denial of the 
defendants' motion to compel arbitration in the Laster case, it 
released its decision in the case of Shroyer v. New Cingular 
Wireless. 24 The issue in Shroyer was whether the binding 
arbitration clause and class arbitration waiver in Cingular's 
standard service contract were enforceable. The three judge 
panel concluded that, under California law, the provisions were 
both unconscionable and unenforceable. The appellate court 
also ruled that the FAA did not preempt the state law relating 
to unconscionable contracts. 25 Since the class arbitration 
waiver at issue in the Shroyer case was substantially identical 
to the one at issue in Laster, the Court of Appeals asked the 
parties in Laster to submit letter briefs discussing the effect of 
.... 
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the Shroyer decision on their pending appeal. 26 At that point, 
all of the defendants except T-Mobile agreed to voluntarily 
dismiss their appeals. After the Circuit Court affirmed the 
lower court's decision to deny T -Mobile's motion to dismiss, 
T-Mobile filed an unsuccessful writ of certiorari with the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In the meantime, the District Court lifted the 
stay that had been .placed on the Laster case while the appeal 
had been pending. 2 
III. IMPACT OF SHROYER ON AT&T MOBILE 
In March 2008, AT&T filed a motion to compel the 
Concepcions to submit their dispute to the mandatory 
individual arbitration procedure that was outlined in AT &T's 
revised wireless agreement of December 2006. 28 According to 
AT&T, the class arbitration waiver in the amended agreement 
was not only "substantially distinct" from the waiver 
considered in the Shroyer case but it also provided a sufficient 
substitute for any class action relief that its customers had 
waived. The Concepcions responded with two arguments. The 
first was that the terms of the 2006 revised arbitration provision 
were inapplicable since the amendments had only been added 
after the Concepcions had filed their lawsuit. The second was 
that even if the revised terms relating to arbitration and class 
actions were applicable they were still unconscionable and, 
therefore, unenforceable under California law. While the 
District Court ruled that federal and California law both 
allowed AT&T to base its claim on the revised terms, 29 it 
denied AT &T's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds 
that California contract law did not allow an unconscionable 
contract provision to be enforced. 30 It concluded instead that 
although the AT&T consumer agreement was only marginally 
a contract of adhesion31 and even though the premium damage 
clause provided an incentive for consumers to pursue small 
claims in arbitration, 32 the arbitration provision did not 
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sufficiently deter AT&T from retaining the benefits of its 
wrongful conduct and continuing that conduct with impunity. 33 
AT&T presented three main arguments when it filed its 
appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals. The first was that the 
decision in Shroyer was inapplicable since AT &T's amended 
premium payment provision did not have the practical effect of 
rendering AT&T immune from individual claims. The second 
was that the amended arbitration clause was neither 
unconscionable nor unenforceable. The third was that the FAA 
preempted California's unconscionability law. 34 A three judge 
panel unanimously rejected each claim and affirmed the lower 
court' s decision. 
The Ninth Circuit's de nova review of the motion to compel 
arbitration began by reaffirming the holding of the California 
Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court. 35 In that 
case, the state court had ruled that a class action waiver in a 
mandatory arbitration provision was unconscionable if it was 
part of a consumer adhesion contract " in which disputes 
between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with 
the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to 
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money."36 The Court of Appeals 
held that, under state law, AT&T's premium payment 
provision did not negate the unconscionability of the class 
action waiver. Although it was true that the provision would 
penalize AT&T if it low-balled an offer, it still did nothing to 
provide incentives to individual customers to pursue small 
claims. 37 The Court concluded that the FAA did not preempt 
California' s unconscionability law since the state law did not 
stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."38 California 
law did not undermine the FAA's purpose of placing 
.... 
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arbitration agreements on the same footing as any other 
contract since class arbitration waivers in adhesion contracts 
and class action waivers in other contracts would both be 
voided if found to be unconscionable. 39 As to the second 
purpose of the FAA, the promotion of efficient and expeditious 
resolution of claims, the Court reaffirmed its previous holding 
in Shroyer in which it concluded that when large numbers of 
consumers sought compensation based on similar claims, a 
class arbitration proceeding was actually simpler, cheaper, and 
40 faster for the consumers as well as the defendant company. 
IV. AT&T MOBILE AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
Business and consumer groups both knew that a great deal 
was at stake when the U.S. Supreme Court granted the writ of 
certiorari to hear the case (now under the heading of AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion et ux.) Yet even after oral 
arguments had concluded, it was still unclear where the nine 
justices stood on the three most compelling issues- whether 
there was any reason in this particular case for not continuing 
the general policy of favoring arbitration agreements, whether 
there was a specific justification for allowing class action 
waivers in consumer arbitration agreements, and whether the 
FAA preempted the California law on unconscionability. It 
was not until April 27, 2011, when Justice Antonin Scalia 
began to deliver the decision of the Court that it became 
evident that consumers who entered into standard form 
contracts containing mandatory arbitration agreements and 
class action waivers had lost in a very big way. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4, decision reversed the 
Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case. Justice 
Scalia's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Anthony Kennedy, and Samuel Alito. Justice Clarence 
Thomas delivered a concurring opinion and Justice Stephen 
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Breyer issued a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonya Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. 
The focus of all three opinions was the interpretation of §2 of 
the FAA- which the Court, in an earlier decision, had 
characterized as "the primary substantive provision of the 
Act."41 Section 2 states that: "A written provision in any 
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract. " 42 It was the interpretation of the second part of this 
section- the savings clause-on which the justices disagree. 
A. Majority Opinion 
According to Scalia, the primary issue before the Court was 
"whether the FAA prohibits States from conditioning the 
enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the 
availability of classwide arbitration procedures."43 To resolve 
that issue it was necessary to determine whether California's 
rule regarding unconscionability (as articulated in the Discover 
Bank case) was covered by the FAA's savings clause. Scalia 
began his analysis of that issue only after reaffirming the 
Court' s previous holdings that Section 2 of the FAA reflects a 
" liberal federal policy favoring arbitration"44 and the 
"fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of 
, 45 A b. . contract. s a consequence, ar 1tratwn agreements were on 
equal footing with any other contracts and should be enforced 
according to their terms- unless, under the terms of the 
savings clause, they were found to be unenforceable "upon 
such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract." It was at this point, that Scalia delivered a 
decision that greatly limited the scope of the savings clause 
especially with regard to consumer arbitration agreements. 
47 I Vol27 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
Scalia acknowledged that the FAA's savings clause allowed 
an arbitration agreement to be invalidated by ""generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability" but not by defenses that apply only to 
arbitration or derive their meanin? from the fact that an 
agreement to arbitrate is at issue."4 He then addressed the 
validity of the Discover Bank holding that classified collective 
arbitration waivers as unconscionable only when they were 
included in consumer contracts. Under California statutory 
law, a court may either refuse to enforce any contract that was 
"unconscionable at the time it was made" or "limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause." 47 In the Discover 
Bank case, the California Supreme Court found that a class 
action waiver in a consumer adhesion contract typically applied 
to disputes that involved small sums of money and a party with 
superior bargaining power who included the waiver in the 
contract in order to cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money. The waiver was 
unconscionable because it exempted the non-consumer party to 
the contract from its own fraud or willful injury to the 
consumer party. 
Scalia presented two alternative possibilities for deciding 
the outcome of the case. If California' s unconscionability 
doctrine and policy against exculpation were grounds "that 
exist at law or equity for the revocation of a contract," then 
they were applicable under the FAA's savings clause. On the 
other hand, if it turned out that these generally applicable 
doctrines had been used to disfavor arbitration, they were 
preempted by the FAA. 48 Scalia chose the second theory to 
rule against consumers and in favor of business. He 
hypothesized that a state could not target consumer arbitration 
agreements as unconscionable or unenforceable simply because 
they deprived the consumer of judicially monitored discovery 
or did not abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence or did not 
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allow for a trial by jury. Such actions would clearly be seen as 
obstacles to the accomplishment of the stated purposes of the 
FAA. Similarly, if the "overarching purpose" of the FAA was 
"to the enforcement agreements accordinffl 
to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings,"4 
then "requiring the availability of classwide arbitration 
interfere[ d] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus 
create[ d) a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."50 
Scalia referred to §§2, 3, and 4 of the FAA to support his 
position that the principal purpose of the FAA was to ensure 
that private arbitration agreements were enforced according to 
their terms. Section 2 stated that, subject to the savings clause, 
arbitration agreements were "valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable." Section 3 required litigation of arbitral claims to 
be stayed pending arbitration of those claims "in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement." Finally, §4 instructed courts 
to compel arbitration "in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement" so long as the "making of the arbitration agreement 
or the failure ... to perform the same" was not at issue. Scalia 
reasoned that parties to an arbitration agreement may specify 
the issues to be arbitrated, 51 select the rules of arbitration, 52 and 
limit with whom a party may arbitrate its dispute. 53 This 
ability to design particular arbitration processes according to 
the needs of different kinds of disputes reduced the cost at the 
same time that it increased the speed of dispute resolution. 
In his dissenting opinion, Breyer quoted the case of Dean 
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd54 in which the Supreme Court 
" reject[ ed] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the 
Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of 
claims." Scalia claimed that the dissent's use of that particular 
quote was misleading. Although it was true that the Court in 
Dean Witter stated that the purpose of the FAA was to "ensure 
judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to 
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arbitrate," 55 it also pointed out that "this is not to say that 
Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legislation for 
expedited resolution of disputes."56 
In the present case, Scalia found no conflict between the 
two goals of the FAA- the enforcement of private agreements 
and the encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute 
resolution- in enforcing the terms of the AT&T arbitration 
clause. He did, however, see a conflict between the FAA's 
promotion of arbitration and California's Discover Bank rule. 
The Discover Bank rule interfered with arbitration the same 
way a state law rule that required the parties to exhaust 
administrative remedies before proceeding to arbitration 
frustrated the objective of the FAA. 57 Although the California 
rule did not require class-wide arbitration in all consumer 
contract cases, it did have the same practical result. The 
application of the rule was limited to adhesion contracts where 
the damages were predictably small and the consumer alleged a 
scheme to cheat consumers. Scalia, however, noted that most 
consumer contracts were adhesion contracts, that the idea of a 
small claim was very relative, and that all the consumer had to 
do was allege a scheme to cheat. As a result, most consumers 
would have the option to resolve their disputes through 
bilateral arbitration or through class arbitration. Given that 
option, Scalia speculated that a consumer would have difficulty 
finding a lawyer who would be willing to handle an individual 
arbitration claim when the possibility of a class action existed. 
Businesses, on the other hand, would have less incentive to use 
arbitration for individual claims when faced with exposure to 
the inevitable class arbitration. 
In order to illustrate the problems ansmg from class 
arbitration Scalia referred to the recent case of Stolt-Nielen v. 
lnt 'I. Corp. 58 in which the Supreme Court held 
that an arbitration panel had exceeded its authority under the 
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when it imposed class procedures that arose from policy 
Judgments and not from the terms of the arbitration agreement 
or the interpretative principals of contract law. The basis for 
the decision was the Court's conclusion that the "changes 
brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-
action arbitration" were "fundamental."59 In class actions 
parties may be absent, additional and different procedures may 
be needed, there is the potential for a loss of confidentiality, 
and, it is likely that there will not be many arbitrators 
knowledgeable in the procedural aspects of class certification. 
Scalia then focused on the three problematic differences 
between bilateral arbitration and class action arbitration. The 
first was the loss of the primary advantage of arbitration- its 
informality. In bilateral arbitration, the parties "forgo 
procedural rigor and appellate review" in exchange for "lower 
costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose 
expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes. "60 In class 
action arbitration, the arbitrators must certify the class and 
determine how discovery for the class witt be conducted before 
they can even begin to consider the merits of the claims. Scalia 
cited a study by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
reporting that, on the average, it took six months to resolve an 
individual consumer arbitration claim on the merits (four 
months if the arbitration was conducted by documents only.)61 
Of the 283 class arbitration cases opened as of September 
2009, 121 remained active, 162 had been settled, withdrawn, or 
dismissed, and not a single one had resulted in a final award on 
the merits. The median time from filing to settlement, 
withdrawal or dismissal of class arbitration cases that were no 
longer active was 583 days. 62 
The second difference between bilateral and class action 
arbitration cases was that class arbitration required procedural 
formality similar to that found in the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure in order to protect the interests of all members of the 
class. 63 Scalia noted that many procedural problems facing 
arbitrators in class action cases had certainly not been 
anticipated by the drafters of the FAA since class actions had 
not even been available at the time the statute was enacted. 
The final difference, which seemed to be particularly 
important to Scalia, was the fact that class arbitration greatly 
increased the risks to defendants. The defendants were aware 
that it was inevitable that errors might occur in informal 
arbitration procedures which could not be corrected through an 
appeal process. But, it was an infrequent cost that they were 
willing to pay in exchange for not having to incur the expenses 
of going to court. That cost-benefit analysis changed, however, 
when the inevitable error no longer involved a relatively small 
individual claim but claims of a sizeable class of plaintiffs. In 
those instances, even the chance of an error might pressure a 
defendant into settling claims which, on the merits, might have 
been questionable. An important issue in a class action case 
involves the certification of the class. Under the FAA, the only 
time that a court may vacate an arbitral award was if it "was 
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means"; "the 
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone 
the hearing .. . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy[,] or of any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced"; or if the 
"arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final , and definite award . . . was not 
rnade."64 While certification decisions were reviewable, under 
the FAA review was limited to the misconduct of the 
arbitrators and not on an error in applying the law. Under the 
circumstances, Scalia doubted whether a defendant would 
agree to class arbitration with no means of review or whether 
Congress would want state courts to place the defendant in 
such a position. 
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Scalia acknowledged that many of the small dollar claims 
that individual consumers had against AT&T would never be 
pursued without the benefit of a class action option. That result 
by itself, however, did not justify allowing a state to require a 
"procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA even if it is 
desirable for unrelated reasons."65 The thing that 
mattered was the fact that California's rule on 
unconscionability "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress. " 66 
B. Concurring Opinion 
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion focused on the issue of 
whether the Discover Bank rule was, under the savings clause 
of the FAA, a "groun[ d] ... for the revocation of any contract." 
Thomas' textual reading of §2 limited a court's ability to 
revoke an arbitration agreement only on the basis of an 
illegally (such as fraud or duress) in the formation of the 
agreement. 
67 
The fact that a particular state law defense 
applied "to any contract" was not by itself sufficient to revoke 
the arbitration agreement if that defense represented nothing 
more than a state's public policy against arbitration. It was 
significant to Thomas that while §2 states that arbitration 
provisions in contracts are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract," it "does not parallel the words 
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" by referencing the 
grounds as exist for the "invalidation, revocation, or 
nonenforcement" of any contract."68 The omission allowed him 
to conclude that the exception in the savings clause did not 
apply to any contract defense but only to a subset of those 
defenses. Although Thomas acknowledged that courts have 
referred concepts of revocability, validity, and 
enforceability Interchangeably, he found it significant that 
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Congress only chose to include the concept of revocability in 
the savings clause. 
To understand the meaning of the savings clause, Thomas 
turned to §4 of the FAA (which specified that if a court was 
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the 
failure to comply was not an issue, it must order arbitration 
according to the terms of the agreement.) He concluded that if 
§2 was read harmoniously with §4 then the only grounds for 
revoking an arbitration agreement under §2 would be those 
relating to the making of the agreement- and not other 
defenses- such as public policy- that were unrelated to the 
making of the agreement. 69 
Under the Discover Bank rule, the class action waiver in a 
consumer contract of adhesion was unconscionable because it 
was unlawfully exculpatory- and contrary to public policy. 
But the Discover Bank rule did not concern itself with the ' . making of the arbitration agreement. There was no clatm of 
fraud, duress, or delusion on the part of the consumer. 70 It was 
the terms, conditions, and practices contained in the arbitration 
agreement that the California court held to undermine public 
policy. And, that public policy reason was an 
ground for refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement smce 1t 
had nothing to do with whether the contract was properly 
made. 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion reveals a frustration with 
the majority's interpretation of the savings clause of the FAA. 
According to the minority opinion, "grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract" would surely 
include the Discover Bank rule. In the Discover Bank case, the 
California court, interpreting §§ 1668 and 1670.5(a) of the 
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California Civil Code, concluded that a class action waiver in a 
consumer contract was exculpatory and unconscionable when: 
1. the consumer contract was an adhesion contract, 2. the 
disputes between the parties were predictably for small 
amounts of damages, and 3. it was alleged that the party with 
the superior bargaining power had carried out a scheme of 
deliberately cheating large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money. 
The Discover Bank rule did not invalidate all class action 
waivers in consumer contracts-only those which offended the 
more general principle of unconscionability. That principle did 
not target arbitration agreements since it applied equally to 
class action litigation waivers as well as class action arbitration 
waivers. It was, under the terms of the savings clause, a valid 
ground on which to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement 
that exists "for the revocation of any contract." (Emphasis 
added.)71 
Breyer found no inconsistency between the Discover Bank 
rule and the basic purpose behind the FAA. Although the 
House Report in support of the original bill emphasized the 
costliness and delays of litigation, the expeditious resolution of 
claims through arbitration was not Congress' overriding goal in 
enacting the FAA. The purpose of the FAA was to ensure the 
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements in commercial 
contracts and admiralty contracts by placing them "upon the 
same footing as other contracts." 72 
The minority opinion was critical of the majority's claim 
that the Discover Bank rule was an obstacle to the objective of 
the FAA since it would increase the complexity of arbitration 
procedures and discourage parties from entering into 
arbitration agreements. 73 While the California rule might, in 
some instances, invalidate an unconscionable anti-class 
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arbitration contract term, it did not follow that that would 
increase the complexity of the arbitration procedures. Breyer 
also rejected the suggestion that applying the Discover Bank 
rule was just as unacceptable as requiring arbitration 
agreements to provide for the ultimate disposition by a jury, a 
judicially monitored discovery, and the use of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 74 Class action arbitration was consistent 
with arbitration and was well known in California and 
elsewhere. Even the American Arbitration Association had 
characterized class arbitration as "a fair, balanced, and efficient 
f 1 . I d. "75 means o reso vmg c ass tsputes. 
Breyer challenged the majority's assumption that individual, 
rather than class, arbitration, was a fundamental attribution of 
arbitration. He found no basis for such a claim in the 
legislative history. While it was true that at the time the FAA 
was enacted, arbitration procedures had not yet been fully 
developed, 76 there was evidence to suggest that as Congress 
was considering the legislation it thought of arbitration 
primarily in the context of merchants who "sought to resolve 
disputes of fact, not law, under customs of their industries, 
where the parties possessed roughly equivalent bargaining 
power." 77 This would suggest that a compelling 
Congressional concern had been that the bargaining power be 
roughly equivalent in the arbitration process. If that were the 
case, consumer class arbitration, which helps to level the 
playing field with merchants, would be consistent with that 
objective. 78 
The minority opinion also rejected the claim that the 
incentives to include a mandatory arbitration clauses in 
contracts would disappear if potential defendants knew that the 
result might be complex class arbitration. On the issue of 
incentives, Breyer argued that the relevant comparison was not 
between bilateral arbitration and class action arbitration but 
-......._ __ _ 
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between class arbitration and judicial class actions. 79 In such a 
comparison, parties would not necessarily be discouraged from 
including mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts. One 
incentive for agreeing to arbitration is that it saves time. While 
class arbitration may be more time consuming than bilateral 
arbitration, it is still less time consuming than the average class 
action litigation. Similarly, if speed in resolving a dispute is 
an objective of the FAA, AAA statistics have suggested that "a 
single class proceeding is surely more efficient than thousands 
of separate proceedings for identical claims."80 The dissent 
found no empirical support for the majority's claim that there is 
a disincentive for parties to submit high stack claims to 
arbitration. 81 It also pointed out that even though contract 
defenses might "slow down the dispute resolution process," 
that was something that federal arbitration law treated as a state 
law matter--unless the defense was being used to disfavor 
arbitration. 82 
Scalia had highlighted the practical disadvantages of class 
arbitration-it greatly increased the risks to the defendants and 
might pressure defendants into settling questionable claims 
rather than face the chance of a devastating loss. Breyer, on 
the other hand, emphasized the countervailing advantages of 
class arbitration. The first was that without the possibility of a 
consolidated arbitration, many small dollar claimants would 
simply abandon their claims. The second was that tenacious 
parties, such as the Concepcions, would have difficulty finding 
attorneys to represent them in proceedings involving small 
claims and even smaller fees. As Breyer noted, "The realistic 
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, 
but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or fanatic sues for 
$30."83 
In his review ofU.S. Supreme Court cases, Breyer found no 
"meaningful" support for many of the majority's legal 
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conclusions. Instead he found precedents that authorized 
complex arbitration procedures, 84 upheld nondiscriminatory 
state laws that slowed down the proceedings, 85 and refused to 
strike down a state statute that treated arbitration on par with 
judicial and administrative proceedings. 86 Other cases 
reaffirmed that the basic objective of the FAA was to treat 
arbitration agreements "like all other contracts' 87 and not to 
immunize them from judicial challenges in a way that elevated 
the arbitration agreement above other forms of contracts. 88 
The dissenting opinion concluded with a brief discussion of 
a basic premise of federalism- "that does not 
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." 9 Breyer noted 
that the savings clause of the FAA clearly recognized that the 
states had a role of determining if there were grounds at law or 
in equity for revoking a particular arbitration contract. 
Consequently, the Court failed to honor federalist principles 
when it ignored the specific language of the savings clause and 
struck down the California law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion case may very well 
become a milestone case not because of the legal reasoning that 
the Supreme Court used to interpret the savings clause or 
because of its predictable reaffirmation of the arbitration 
process. On the contrary, it may be remembered as the case 
that not only changed the future of consumer class action 
arbitration but also the future of consumer class action 
litigation in the United States. 
Soon after the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the 
AT&T Mobility case, the Wall Street Journal and the New York 
Times presented the public with two views of what was at 
stake. The editors of The Wall Street Journal, referring to the 
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case as "the $30 bonanza," conjured up a fantasy dream for 
business . . . "[i]magine if class action lawsuits become a 
historical curiosity like spiked hair and platform shoes. While 
we would never underestimate the resilience of trial lawyers, a 
case heard by the Supreme Court ... could put a damper on the 
class action bonanza."90 The New York Times, on the other 
hand, referred to the AT&T Mobility case as the "latest in the 
arbitration war-a battle over whether the United States will 
increasingly have a privatized system of justice that bars 
people from enforcing rights in court and, if so, what will be 
considered fair in that system. It would be grossly unfair for 
the court to let the corporation get away with what it wants to 
in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion- a case that involves a small 
amount of money and a huge principle."91 In the end the $30 
bonanza was not a windfall for trial lawyers and consumers-
but a gigantic bonanza for business. In this case the winners 
did take all. 
The majority opinion focused on what would happen if the 
class action arbitration clause was invalidated. Businesses 
would have less incentive to include arbitration clauses in 
adhesion contracts. A few losses to individual claimants were 
one thing-but a single loss to a larger class of consumers was 
perhaps too risky. Under those circumstances, businesses 
might find the litigation process preferable to the arbitration 
process (with its limited discovery possibilities, flexible rules 
of evidence, and limited possibility of review). What the 
Court chose not to consider was what business would do if the 
provision prohibiting class actions was upheld. One 
consequence of the Court's decision in Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams9 was the increased use of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. After the AT&T 
Mobility decision, it would not be far-fetched to anticipate two 
strategic moves by business. The first would be to amend 
employment application forms and contracts to include class 
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action waivers as well as mandatory arbitration clauses. The 
second would be to redraft all types of consumer sales 
contracts to include mandatory arbitration clauses with class 
action waivers. The end result might not only be the demise of 
class action arbitration but also individual and class action 
litigation for cases involving claims by consumers and 
employees. 
Although things do appear bleak for employees and 
consumers seeking to invalidate mandatory arbitration with 
anti-class action clauses, there is still the possibility of change. 
Soon after the Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T 
Mobility, Representative Henry Johnson (D-GA) and Senator 
Al Franken (D-MN) introduced a bill in Congress that was 
intended to invalidate a number of the Court' s recent decisions 
involving arbitration. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 93 
would prohibit employers and businesses from including pre-
dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and 
consumer contracts where the subsequent conflicts involve 
statutorily protected civil rights. The likelihood that the 
current Congress will pass the bill is quite slim. There is also 
the possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court itself might revisit 
its current policy in favor of mandatory consumer arbitration 
clauses when it decides the case of CompCredit Corp., et al. v. 
Greenwood, et a/. 94 Unfortunately discussion by the justices 
during oral arguments indicated that their decision is going to 
be a reiteration of majority' s support of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements . One final possibility is that the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), under the provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, might be able to limit the future use of 
arbitration agreements (at least as they apply to consumer 
financial products such as credit cards, auto financing, 
installment loans, and checking and deposit accounts.) 
Congress authorized the CFPB is authorized to study the use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and, if it 
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was found to be in the public interest and would protect 
consumers, issue regulations prohibiting the use of mandatory 
b. . ar 1trat10n agreements. 
The Roberts ' Court has demonstrated in case after case that 
it is indeed " the Corporate Court." Its willingness to enforce a 
mandatory arbitration clause that prohibits class actions by 
consumers is a lopsided decision in favor of business interests. 
Consumers and employees have no real bargaining power 
when they enter into standard form contracts that preclude 
litigation. They know that they are in a " take it or leave it" 
position. This is even more so now that the Court has 
concluded that a claim of substantive unconscionability will 
not be allowed to frustrate what it understands to be the higher 
goal of the FA A. 
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HOW THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AFFECTS 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
by 
* John Paul 
INTRODUCTION 
Earnings management has been on the rise. The recent 
corporate accounting scandals involving large well-known 
companies such as Enron, W orldCom, Xerox and Tyco - all 
audited by large accounting firms - suggest serious 
deficiencies in the accounting standards and corporate 
governance and regulatory systems designed to guide and 
monitor the financial information process. 1 While large firms 
may have received more media attention, financial statement 
fraud occurred more frequently in smaller companies 
(companies with total assets of less than $100 million) than 
larger ones. 2 
Since earnings management has been on the rise, a 
definition of earnings management is in order. Earnings 
management is when managers alter their entities' accounting 
and financial information by using their discretion in financial 
reporting and transaction structuring. 
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